Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS) 
Creating Framework for Analysis of ISIS Insurgency

1 An Organization that Calls Itself a State but is an Insurgent Group
ISIS"s propaganda efforts both within controlled areas and outside devoted considerable energy to maintain a perception that it is indeed a "state" able to fulfill state-like services for its population and effectively govern, especially on local level. 19 Such a paradigm is wrong (obviously) both morally and analytically. ISIS is simple an insurgency, albeit a successful one. And all successful insurgencies in the history that managed to control territory had to govern population under its rule and try to "keep basic services running" just as it was under counterinsurgent"s rule. Otherwise, the population would hardly comply with insurgents. 20 As Kalyvas argues, pure violence of insurgents against civilians is an inefficient tool to control population. 21 As a result of the Western experience with wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, there has been a renewed surge of literature about the concepts of insurgency and counterinsurgency (reflected for example in series of studies by RAND Corporation, works of David Kilcullen, T. X. Hammes, discussions in The Small War Journal and The Long War Journal). Broadly, the concept of insurgency can be defined with David Kilcullen as -(...) a popular movement that seeks to overthrow the status quo through subversion, political activity, insurrection, armed conflict and terrorism.‖ 22 Kilcullen"s definition clearly shows a wide spectrum of activities that insurgents usually do: from non-violent ones, such as (illegal) political activity, subversion, to armed conflict and terrorism. Most insurgencies combine several tools together with respect to their power or contextual position in pursue for their ultimate strategic goal. They do so -(...) step by step, in order to attain specific intermediate objectives leading finally to the overthrow of the existing order.‖ 23 For example, although ISIS was able to conduct numerous terrorist attacks in Iraq in 2011-2013, it was not strong enough to wage a truly large-scale conventional armed conflict against Baghdad until June 2014.
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2 Lifespan of Insurgency
I draw a narrative of main events in the insurgency of ISIS and its organization predecessors in Iraq and As Byman"s study 28 suggests, proto-insurgencies require a suitable environment in order to create its identity, exploiting cause, a safe haven, and sustain security forces" attempts to erase it. In case of Iraq, it was indeed increasing weakness of the state, poor governance, and persisting existence of a root cause which was Sunni"s marginalization in the hands of al-Maliki"s Baghdad. 29 In Syria, an emerging civil war allowed actors to exploit existing sectarian divides (albeit they were arguably not as strong as in Iraq carrying Saddan"s legacy). 30 If the government"s provisions are seen as sufficient and if the regime is perceived as "fair and legitimate" in the eyes of population, it is hard for insurgents to win their popular support, even though they manage to find a sounding root cause.
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"cause", which is -(...) a broad perception of injustice linked to to the government that insurgents use to mobilize a population.‖ 31 A root cause might be based on identity (religious, ethnic), religion (a belief that religion should drive politics), corruption, inequality, general sense of injustice etc. David Galula also asserts that it must be a -deep-seated‖ and not easily espoused by the counterinsurgent. 32 35 Byman notes that at this point, insurgency has a very good chance to prevail. 36 I also add the fourth phase to RAND"s framework, which is in Galula"s sense 37 a final stage of every insurgency, a "conventional stage" -the point when it is powerful enough to challenge counterinsurgent in conventional warfare. Ingram TWJ"s insurgency transformed quickly into small scale insurgency with a tipping point marked by major car bombings in Baghdad in August 2003 (it targeted Shi"ite mosque in Najaf, UN Mission headquarters, and Jordanian embassy in Baghdad). TWJ indeed made their operational presence felt, and although it was only one of the actors of gradually brewing Sunni insurgency, it had a very favorable starting point with already established covert networks, sleeper cells and experienced fighters often with experience from in Afghan wars. ISIS had skillfully exploited Sunni grievances and positioned itself as a saviour of Sunni population against Shi"ites (which AQI and its successors actually fueled itself by promoting sectarian violence when targeting Shi"ite civilians as a part of their tactics of provocation).
Another tipping point that heralded transformation to large scale insurgency was September 2004, when az-Zarqawi officially pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda and the organization became known as al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Official al-Qaeda sanctioning made AQI the main platform for flocking foreign fighters, and as well for home-grown radical Islamists. AQI experienced stable growth in emerging chaos in Iraq. It was staging major terrorist attacks. alShishani estimates 39 that in the first two years of the US occupation (up to April 2005), only 14 % of insurgent"s attacks can be attributed to az-Zarqawi"s group (it is worth noting that in almost 50 % of cases the group used suicide bombings often in cars). Despite its relatively small role, it was attracting an incredible amount of media attention and AQI was "hunted down" by occupation forces, which made it desirable for recruits, and forged a perception that AQI is a major actor of Sunni insurgency. By 2006, AQI was even able to control some neighborhoods in Baghdad, areas in al-Anbar province. It sustained despite az-Zarqawi"s death in the summer of 2006. In 2007, Islamic State of Iraq (it renamed itself after az-Zarqawi"s death) took a defensive stance after the US troops surge and Sahwa (Sunni tribal militias fighting insurgents) were introduced.
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Sahwa and surge indeed had success as it is seen on graphs of casualties below and by early 2009, ISI was severely damaged and the security situation in Iraq bettered considerably. In 2009-2011 ISI"s insurgency turned again into a small scale phase, since it reduced conducted attacks, lost control over territory and was in general in hiding (and stripped of a large portion of their cadres either due to targeted killings, or sentences to imprisonment). At this dormant stage, ISI also moved to Mosul and focused rather on criminal activities, establishing sources of income. ISI developed considerable pool of resources due to their extensive criminal enterprises. -A group that already has resourcing could potentially become an insurgency.‖ 40 In other words, if the group has already established system for generating income (for example by running successful criminal enterprises), it has better position to start (or renew) insurgency.
At this point, ISIS was not able to fully control large spans of territory. After the complete US pullout in 2011, Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (name adopted in April 2013) insurgency again started to gradually ramp up its intensity into very intensive large scale insurgency until the firs half of 2013 in Syria and June 2014 in Iraq. A surge of civilian and ISF deaths is also clearly seen in 2013 in casualties statistics presented below. With the US pullout in 2011, an opportunity to expand the operation to war-torn Syria, and in a wider sense al-Maliki"s sectarian governance, it managed to resurfac eonce again. In 2012, ISI was staging prison breaks to free their cadres in "Breaking the Walls Campaign", in 2013 it was able to mount up attacks against ISF in "Soldier Harvest Campaign". By 2014, ISIS had a firm and visible presence in al-Anbar, Salah ad-Din, Ninawa, Diayla and outskirts of Baghdad. In January 2014 ISF defence broke down as ISIS took parts of al-Anbar.
In June 2014, ISIS insurgency was able to successfully challenge counterinsurgents in conventional warfare and countinued to do so by capturing the key Iraqi city of Ramadi in May 2015. Reaching the fourth, "conventional" stage, is marked by a tipping point when insurgent is able to successfully conduct conventional warfare against counterinsurgent. In ISIS case, the delcaration of Caliphate in June 2014 may be regarded as the beginning of the fourth stage. , al-Maqdisi"s texts were highly influential and were dominating the list of most read jihadist texts in the key Tawhed.ws website.
Both az-Zarqawi and al-Maqdisi were arrested in March 1994 by Jordanian intelligence. Weaver asserts that imprisonment was az-Zarqawi"s "university", where he became more focused, brutal, and decisive. 50 After his release in 1999, he traveled back to Afghanistan and found himself in charge of a small start-up training camp in Herat funded by al-Qaeda. 51 His group known as "at-Tawhid wa al-Jihad" consisting of some 300 militants retreated to Iran in December 2001 amid invasion to Afghanistan and later relocated to Baghdad and then northern Iraq in Kurdish Sulaymaniyah province.
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Shortly after the US-led invasion in March 2003, az-Zarqawi"s TWJ staged several highprofile terrorist attacks in Baghdad. These events highlighted TWJ"s strategy and az-Zarqawi"s priorities. On August 7, a car bomb detonated at the Jordanian embassy in Baghdad killing 17 people. 53 60 Zarqawists" calculation was simple -attack Shi"ites on every front, they will respond harshly towards Sunnis and we will come out as their saviours.
2 az-Zarqawi Pledges Allegiance to al-Qaeda
The events described in previous chapter mark an evolution of insurgency from a proto-stage to a small insurgency stage. High profile attacks attracted more followers and TWJ started to grow larger. TWJ continued to ramp up its presence by further expanding its areas of operation for example to Fallujah in al-Anbar and also strengthened its position in the outskirts of Baghdad where it continued to target Coalition forces and Shi"ite civilians. 61 They proved to be an excellent armed propaganda move to create perception of TWJ as a "strong element of Iraqi insurgency". 62 TWJ also very quickly passed the small insurgency phase, and I mark its end with the pledge of allegiance (bay"at) to al-Qaeda and bin Ladin in October 2004, when the organization became known as "al-Qaeda in Iraq" (AQI). 63 Az-Zarqawi was a considerable asset for al-Qaeda that is why bin Ladin agreed to accept his bay"at, despite the fact they had their differences which was later revealed in the 2005-correspondence between al-Qaeda"s commander az-Zawahiri and az-Zarqawi. 64 al-Qaeda for example disagreed with brutality against Shi"ite civilians, destroying their mosques. After azZarqawi pledged allegiance to bin Ladin and al-Qaeda in October 2004, it was indeed the most "legitimate" actor to fight in jihad in Iraq, and it truly helped the organization to flourish. 
1 al-Qaeda in Iraq Becomes Notorious
Although AQI and az-Zarqawi were getting incredible attention in media due to their atrocities, they were at that time only one of the elements of the brewing Sunni Insurgency in Iraq. 70 alShishani estimates 71 that in the first two years of the US occupation (up to April 2005) only 14 % of insurgent"s attacks can be attributed to az-Zarqawi"s group (it is worth noting that in almost 50 % of cases the group used suicide bombings often in cars, which is still a typical modus operandi of AQI"s successors 73 (rafida -"those who reject" -is a derogatory term used for Shi"ites).
AQI at that time was especially active in conducting spectacular attacks in Baghdad "belts"(especially in mixed Sunni-Shia districts). 74 az-Zarqawi focused (also according to later captured evidence) on urban operations in Baghdad belt in order to provoke sectarian violence, and due to its strategic significance since it contained important (industrial) infrastructure. 75 AQI was also building strong presence for example in city of Fallujah, the city of Baqubah northeast of Baghdad, and in Salah ad-Din province (in general, the area densely populated by Sunnis are located north of Baghdad called "The Sunni Triangle" (see map below). 76 Map No. 5. 1: The Sunni Triangle of Iraq.
77
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AQI"s prominence rose and it attracted more individual recruits as well as smaller groups. In January 2006, it announced merger with five other groups (and probably dominated them) and renamed itself to "Majlis Shura al-Mujahideen" (MSM). 78 az-Zarqawi was finally killed by the US airstrike in the city of Baqubah in June 2006. 79 The following events mark a prelude to a major rift between al-Qaeda and az-Zarqawi"s group. Abu Ayyub al-Masri was appointed as a new leader of MSM (which still remained loyal to al-Qaeda and bin Ladin). In a few months, Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) . Indeed, not only due to ISI but also due to other Sunni Arab insurgent groups. Sunni revisionists (mostly people with Ba"ath past, or tribes connected to Saddam"s old establishment) wished alter the post-war Iraqi regime once again in their favor. In Bard O"Neill"s words 81 , groups like Izzat ad-Douri"s "Army of the Men of the Naqshbandi Order", were preservationist insurgents who wanted to keep their prominent positions. 82 While their short term goals (attacking the new Baghdad government and Coalition forces) were the same with ISI, their long-term ideas about the nature of "revised Iraq" was naturaly different. Neverthless, due to tactical overlap of their interest ISI elements were often tactically cooperating with ex-Ba"ath insurgents. 83 The same ex-Ba"ath Sunni Arab insurgents within the umbrella group "General Council of the Iraqi Revolutionaries" (established in January 2014) also helped ISIS during its sweep through Sunni parts of Iraq in June 2014. 85 Successful project, also nicknamed by the Coalition forces as "Concerned Local Citizens" bloomed up to 80.000 militias by the end of 2007. 86 Sunni Arabs in militias were given promises to be paid first by the Coalition forces, and then by Baghdad itself with a further prospect of being integrated into regular Iraqi security forces, or scoring civilian jobs (often in public sector). 87 Sahwa project proved to be a short-term success and was targeting especially ISI.
Sahwa project skillfully exploited rising distaste of Sunni tribes towards ISI"s conduct. Sunni tribes had their share of wealth and power during Saddam"s times and were an indeed integral part of his patronage system. Tribes were taking part in black market operations, including smuggling, or racketeering under the auspices of Saddam"s Vice President Izzat adDouri who specialized in overseeing state-sanctioned criminal enterprises. 88 Weiss and Hassan pointedly sum up the reasons for Sunni tribal distaste and ISI"s mistakes: -The tribes chafed at the implementation of a seventh-century civil code in areas ruled by fundamentalists, many of whom were foreign-born and behaved exactly as the colonial usurpers they were meant to expel. Tribal businesses were disrupted or taken over by those seeking their own monopoly on smuggling, and AQI protected its confiscated interest with a mafia's thuggish zeal. It justified killing on the basis of market competition.‖ 89 Cordesman also highlights rising discontent between "nationalist" and "neo-salafist groups" in 2006-2008. 90 Later on, the demand of keeping "Sunni insurgency for Iraqis" was | 12
reflected in ISIS new strategy since now most of the cadres are Iraqis (especially in higher level 91 ), and engage in Sunni tribal areas with increased caution and sharing wealth. 92 Joint operations of Coalition forces, Sons of Iraq (Sahwa), and ISF managed to weaken ex-Ba"ath groups, and ISI so their insurgency lost breath. Many of their commanders were killed and until early 2008, they were forced to operate "under the surface" once again. , which later proved to be an excellent move since the organization later rebuilt Mosul into its major "money-maker". 95 
2 ISI Severely Damaged?
By late 2006, ISI was raising its estimated income to 70-200 million dollars a year. 96 It was consisting of black market operations, racketeering, kidnapping for ransom, and most importantnly oil smuggling, namely from Bayji refineries and oil fields. Its radicalism and ferocious aggressive criminal networks tempering with local Sunni tribes" gray and black market enterprises after all brought tribes against them. ISI suffered and its networks were damaged, many of them isolated, but it was still able to keep its presence in Mosul and to exploit Bayji "oil asset". Shatz 97 estimates that between 2006 and 2009, the organization was despite setbacks able to raise in total 2 billion dollars from oil business.
ISI leader, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi was killed in April 2010 in the joint ISF and the US operation close to Tikrit along with several other senior ISI commanders. 98 The organization was severely weakened and went undercover and was rather focusing more on raising money and establishing (and keeping) viable criminal networks, than on waging intensive campaign of violent attacks. As noted above, ex-Ba"athists were from the beginning of Sunni insurgency often tactically cooperating with ISI. Over time, however, many ex-Ba"ath figures "changed cloak" for radical Islamism (a more sounding root cause than discredited Ba"ath preservationist cause embedded in discredited ideology). Simultaneously with this process, ex-Ba"ath elements within the ISI were increasingly taking ground with their expertise, networks, and also tribal ties (on the origins of the "Unholy Alliance with the Ba"ath" see chapter 7. 1). In June 2010, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (now known as Caliph Ibrahim) came to power after the death of a former leader Abu Omar al-Baghdadi. According to defector from the group known on Twitter as @wikibaghdady, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi"s coming to power was a surprise since he most probably did not even belong among the senior figures.
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1 Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and the Rise of ex-Ba'ath Elements within Islamic State of Iraq (and ash-Sham)
Only little is known about al-Baghdadi"s life. He is Iraqi national, born in Samarra in 1971. 103 After the graduation from Islamic University in Baghdad, he moved to Fallujah and started to work as an assistant to local preachers, later possibly as an imam. 104 That is where his acquaintance with AQI began. Al-Baghdadi served reportedly merely as a low-rank "live letter box" 105 and a guardian of a safe house for the organization. However, he spent the years 2004-06 in the US detention facility of Camp Bucca 106 , where he served his time along with Ba"athist and radical Islamist. After his release there is no information about his occupation within the organization, but he must have somehow climbed the ladder higher. Most probably, he had very close ties to Ba"athist figures within the organization since they staged his election as a new leader in 2010, and up to this date occupied the most prominent executive positions in leadership. ISIS wages multi-language propaganda campaign to create better biography for their leader (most of it are lies). 108 They derive his origin from al-Quraysh tribe (the Prophet"s tribethis lineage is condition to become the Caliph). Also his predecessor Abu Omar al-Baghdadi claimed that he was "al-Qurayshi" 109 in an obvious organization"s attempt to gain religious legitimacy for its utopic Islamic state project. According to the narrative he holds Ph.D. in Islamic studies from Baghdad University, was a professor on Tikrit University, has vast combat experience and is a founder of several groups fighting the US. Soufan Group report comments this narrative as "inherently unlikely". ). al-Baghdadi"s organization increasingly co-opts Arab and foreign jihadists mostly to religious positions in order to gain more legitimacy (they have usually more prestigious religious education). However, key posts seem to remain dominated by Iraqi nationals, often with Ba"athist past.
Indeed, it was al-Baghdadi and ex-Ba"ath figures usually with past in the Saddam"s security apparatus with their know-how and networks who further transformed the organization into a more capable body, especially regarding security, intelligence, and military operations. An unlikely alliance between secular pragmatic Ba"athists and radical Islamists was according to various sources also forged during the US occupation of Iraq when many of the members of IS organizational predecessors spent time in prisons (such as Camp Bucca) along with ex-Ba"athists insurgents.
Ba"athist ideology simply did not succeed in attracting many followers among Sunnis anymore. Therefore, alliance with the radical Islamists with sounding ideology seemed as a good strategic move, ensuring key positions within Sunni insurgency. Thus, their "ideological zeal" for radical Islamist vision of Caliphate may be in many cases just a pragmatic cloak-changing. Nevertheless, we should not underestimate radical Islam as an ideological tool with a potential of gaining legitimacy, or attracting recruits by giving their struggle a label of religious legitimacy. (After all, as the conflict goes on, the growing generation of ISIS cadres will be very likely much more radical than the previous generation due to continuous religious indoctrination.)
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On the other hand, many Ba"athists (especially security officials) had already established connections with radical Islamist circles in Iraq in the 1990s. Saddam Hussein"s regime was flirting with a synthesis of Ba"athist ideology with Islamism since 1993, when he introduced a campaign called "The Return to Faith" (al-Hamlah al-Imaniyah). 114 
2 Sahwa Falls Asleep and al-Maliki's Government Does Not Keep Promises
Although the short term goal of Sahwa was achieved by increasing security and decreasing intensity of Sunni insurgency (and ISI"s operations) 116 , the promised of their incorporation into Baghdad"s security and governance structures was not kept. The Sons of Iraq (roughly 95.000 men in April 2008, 80 % Sunnis) were first paid by the US military around 300 dollars a month. 117 In 2009, the Iraqi governrnent overtook responsibility for paying Sahwa Sunni militias, and their transformation to alternative employment began. 20 % of them was supposed to be vetted and incorporated into police or the army, others were supposed to score government jobs, or privatesector jobs secured by Baghdad government. 118 Al-Maliki"s government was, however, not able (and not willing) to keep the promises given to Sahwa militias. At the end of 2010, only about 40 % of SoI scored a non-security employment (almost 9.000 of them got security-sector job).
119 By early 2013, reliable data provided by the Iraqi government are scarce, and it only vaguely states that 70 % of Sahwa militias were given a job. 120 The real number is probably much lower.
Another problem was "The pervasive feeling among SoI members and leaders is that the government is not doing enough to protect them.‖ 121 Sahwa members were targeted in ISIS and its predecessors" terrorist attacks and assassinations. SoI lost hundreds of members each year (e. g. 528 in 2008), and attacks against them and their relatives continued. ISIS propaganda movie Clanging of the Swords, Part IV released in 2014 shows in numerous scenes assassinations of people with a Sahwa past. In June 2010, for example ISI killed at least forty-five SoI lining for collecting their paycheck in Baghdad. 122 Commander of Sahwa from al-Anbar province Abu Kutaiba al-Shimmeri noted that -We feel very sorry because we see that the Americans and the Iraqi government abandoned the Sahwa.‖ 123 He further complained that SoI are prosecuted by alMaliki"s judicial system and often locked up. 124 It is indeed not only a result of many Sahwa members" criminal history, but also an expression of deep al-Maliki"s establishment distrust towards Sunni militias.
By the half of 2010, ISI was actually offering better salary to its militants than Sahwa members were getting often with delays from Baghdad. 125 This fact with the combination of SoI"s deep-seated grievance towards al-Maliki"s government which did not keep its promises and great deal of economic uncertainty and insecurity of them caused that many of Sahwa lower cadres eventually joined ISIS either as individuals, or small units (or their whole tribe pledged allegiance to ISIS). 126 Lower-level Sahwa members were also given possibility to "atone" for their sins, hand over their weapons and join ISIS cause after July 2014, as is shown in ISIS propaganda movies 127 , or stated for example in Mosul"s "charter of the city" 128 .
In general, Sunnis were more and more expressing their distaste for sectarian politics of al-Maliki"s governments which indeed promoted Shi"ites. 129 In December 30, 2013, a symbolic "trigger" of Sunni defiance occurred. It was a heavy-handed security operation in Ramadi, which resulted in dispersion "protests tent camp", and death of at least seventeen Sunnis. 130 ISIS used it as an excuse to subsequently fuel mayhem by stream of bombings of Shi"ite targets, and thus provoked Baghdad"s forces and their feared Shi"ite militias. The operation was indeed one of the | 15 key breaking points and heralded ISIS success in earning sympathy (or at least getting brand of a "lesser evil") among many Sunnis.
3 ISI Expands to Syria
Since 2011, coinciding with an emerging civil war in Syria, al-Qaeda affiliates (may it be groups, or influential individuals) quickly started to take ground on the battlefield and foreign fighters flooded to the country. 131 This process was faciliatated by already established strong ties of jihadists to Syria and existence of their networks. After the 2003 invasion, Bashar Assad opted for a policy choice to gain support (or at least tolerance) of jihadists fighting against the US occupation. 132 At the same time he "hosted" many ex-Ba"ath figures who fled after the US invasion to Syria, reportedly including above mentioned Saddam"s vice president Izzat adDouri. 133 Damascus pursued this policy with an obvious attempt to warn the US not to even think about bringing similar fate to Assad"s regime. Assad also believed that if he kept "jihadist troublemakers" on the leash and gave them opportunity to fight in Iraq, he would divert their attention from Syria itself. 134 Indeed, he also wanted to create a perception of indispensability of Syria"s regime in "war on terrorism in the region". It capitalized for example in 2010, when Assad"s chief spy Ali Mamlouk met with Department of State"s counterterrorism coordinator Daniel Benjamin and offered cooperation on cracking down jihadists. 135 As soon as there was a power vacuum, al-Qaeda affiliates exploited existing networks and ties and simply reversed the stream of money, weapons and fighters this time from Iraq to Syria. Around August 2011, al-Baghdadi seized the opportunity and started to send small batches of its operatives to Syria, including Abu Muhammad al-Julani, close al-Baghdadi"s aide and future emir of Jabhat an-Nusra. Al-Julani (already senior commander of AQI) opted a strategy of presenting an-Nusra as a "Syria-grown" group, which announced its existence officially on January 24, 2012 in a video posted on al-Manara al-Bayda website. 136 al-Julani"s an-Nusra confused many analytics, since nobody knew exactly where it came from. 137 It indeed quickly grew and became one of the prominent opposition groups throughout 2012 and 2013. As it was officially sanctioned by al-Qaeda"s az-Zawahiri in the first half of 2013, it became the main platform in Syria for flooding foreign fighters from all over the world. 138 Another batches of ISI"s operatives were coming to Syria in late 2012, including excolonel of Saddam"s air force intelligence know as Haji Bakr (a close aide of al-Baghdadi who helped to put him in charge of ISI in 2010). Nicknamed as the "Lord of Shadows" he established himself around Aleppo. He is considered as one of the main architects of the contemporary ISIS" organizational structure and its security and intelligence apparatus. 139 Reportedly, Haji Bakr sketched a strategy to expand to Syria, establish presence there and subsequently use it as the main base for retaking parts of Iraq. 140 He was eventually killed in the shootout in Tal Rifaat close to Aleppo in January 2014. 141 Haji Bakr"s operations were aimed at establishing base for official expansion of ISI to Syria. It was eventually announced in April 2013, when organization itself changed its name to Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS). 142 By that time ISI was indeed already established in Syria and Haji Bakr also managed to covertly obtain support of the groups of fighters from an-Nusra and other jihadist groups such as Liwa at-Tawhid, or Ahrar ash-Sham. These people later after April 2013 openly changed allegiance to ISIS. 
4 "Iraqization" and "Breaking the Walls Campaign"
A process that also raised ISI"s attractiveness within Iraq was a gradual "Iraqization" of its membership. The organization learned its lesson realizing distaste of Sunni (tribal) population with "foreigners" within the organization in 2006-2009. Of course ISIS still employes foreign fighters 144 but in most cases indeed not in leadership position. 145 Also it seems that many of the foreign fighters "causing trouble" in Iraq were moved to operate in Syria, after the resurgence of then-ISI"s franchise Jabhat an-Nusra in 2012. -This improved its social grounding, and operations at the provincial and local levels were designed with community dynamics in mind. It | 16 also gave ISI an enhanced ability to acquire intelligence sources within the Iraqi security apparatus-something it has since exploited extensively.‖ 146 "Iraqization" of ISI came hand in hand with rising prominence of ex-Ba"ath figures as noted above.
A breaking point that heralded an increased intensity of ISI"s insurgency was July 2012, when the organization announced a year along campaign called "Breaking the Walls". By July 2013, ISI managed to free up to several thousand prisoners (most of them with insurgency past, or even directly members of ISI). 147 Final attack of this campaign targeted symbolic Abu Ghraib prison from which more than 500 prisoners escaped. Majority of them were serving sentence for terrorist activities. 148 Lister points out that it was part of ISI"s "reconstruction" since -By early 2010, ISI also sought to rebuild its senior leadership-34 of the group's 42 most senior officials had been killed or captured, with only some being adequately replaced.‖ 149 In 2010, it had only estimated 1000 members in Iraq, in 2012 the number reached 2500 150 was most probably even higher.
By that time, ISI was also able to expand its area of operation within Iraq. Besides stable presence in Mosul, it again secured stronger presence in al-Anbar and Salah ad-Din provinces. It also resurged in Diyala province northeast of Baghdad, and in late 2012 it was controlling ground -for example the town of Sadiy"ah, and was expanding along Diyala river valley further southwest to cities like Baqubah. 151 By the time, when ISI changed its name to "Islamic State of Iraq and as-Sham" in April 2013, marking its official expansion to Syria, its insurgency became more intense again, ISIS was successfully rebuilt and expanded to Syria. Suicide bombing campaign in Iraq started to heat up Monthly death toll rised to 1.000 by July 2013, compared to around 300 deaths in 2011. 152 In 2013, almost 10.000 civilians were killed, compared to 4.000-4.500 deaths in 2010-2012. 
1 Taking Ground in Syria while Divorcing with al-Qaeda
In March 2013, Jabhat an-Nusra"s forces as a vanguard to a larger rebel pursue took ar-Raqqah from Assad"s forces -the first provincial city that the regime lost. 154 On April 8, 2013, al-
Baghdadi declared that -So when the situation in the Levant reached the point it did in terms of bloodshed, transgression against honor, and the cries of help from the people of the Levant and the world's abandonment of them, we had to rise to come and support them. We deputized al Julani, and he is one of our soldiers, and with him a group of our sons, and we pushed them from Iraq to the Levant so as to meet our cells in the Levant.‖
155 He also announced merger of anNusra and ISIS. al-Julani, however, declined the "offer" and pledged bay"at to al-Qaeda"s azZawahiri. 156 az-Zawahiri tried to intervene in quarrel between his two "children" in a communiqué published in al-Jazeera in June 2013, where he claimed that both were wrong since they acted without al-Qaeda"s sanctioning: al-Baghdadi was wrong with declaration of ISIS, alJolani was wrong with claiming his bay"at to az-Zawahiri without his say-so. 157 He also ordered dissolution of ISIS and keeping the two organizations separated -one in Iraq, one in Syria. 158 In June 2014, when al-Baghdadi declared Caliphate in Mosul sermon, the continuation of the rift was imminent. ISIS spokesman al-Adnani stated -We inform the Muslims that, with the announcement of the caliphate, it has become obligatory for all Muslims to give bay'a and support to Caliph Ibrahim.‖ 159 This was indeed a slap in the face of az-Zawahiri"s organization. az-Zawahiri naturally refused al-Baghdadi"s claims, and subsequently introduces "counterCaliph" -legendary Taliban leader Mullah Omar. 160 An ideological battle still continues and both al-Qaeda and ISIS have been competing for pledges of allegiance from groups not only in Syria, but also for example in Maghrib, or Arabian Penninsula. 161 Throughout 2013, ISIS successfully managed to gradually extent its grip in Syria (especially in the areas of ar-Raqqah, Dair az-Zaur, or Aleppo). ISIS managed to do so despite often being targeted by other opposition groups. ISIS eventually made its move to assume | 17 complete control over ar-Raqqah in January 2014 and expelled other rebel groups. 162 At that time many opposition groups and Syrian tribes previously being in alliance with opposition groups changed their cloak and revealed their allegiance to ISIS. 163 It was also a result of a careful ISIS" infiltration of other rebel groups and a "tribal outreach". Subsequently, for many rebels it was simply more prestigious, and economically more beneficial group to join. ISIS now controls and governs vast areas in Syria (Dair az-Zaur, areas around Aleppo, Manbij...), and it has considerable success, except for faltered attempt to capture Kobanî in late 2014. 164 ISIS" success in Syria was also boosted by weapons and ammunition acquired after the fall of Mosul and other Sunni Iraqi cities. Vast supplies up to this day provide ISIS with superior weaponry, although its convoys are often targeted by airstrikes anti-ISIS Coalition"s operation Inherent Resolve (as of May 2015 sorties destroyed around 80 tanks, and 300 humvees 165 ). Only with the fall of Ramadi in May 2015, ISF reportedly left behind hundreds of tanks, artillery pieces, humvees and armored personnel carriers to ISIS. 166 Interesting point is that Assad"s and ISIS" forces are not often in direct military engagement. One of the exceptions is taking city of Palmyra in May 2015. 167 It is a part of silent temporary marriage of convenience, when Assad calculates that ISIS is a good tool to weaken other opposition militants, and also that the West will eventually come around and make a deal with him to counter ISIS. On the other hand, ISIS is pretty happy that it does not have another intensive battlefront to maintain.
2 A Path to Declaration of Caliphate in Iraq and Beyond
Right after ISIS finalized its "Breaking the Walls Campaign" by attacking Abu Ghraib prison, Abu Muhammad al-Adnani (now ISIS spokesman) immediately announced a campaign called "Soldier Harvest" (on July 29, 2013) . 168 In the second half of 2013, ISIS already renewed its pool of experienced cadres by freeing hundreds of them from prisons during the "Breaking the Walls Campaign". At the same time the organization"s direct presence began to be visible and their presence was felt strongly even outside their undeclared headquarters in Mosul. 169 al-Adnani kept his July 29 promise of reclaiming territory controlled previously by AQI.
In 2013, ISIS had already started skirmishes and operations that established their more open presence in key areas of Ninawa or Salah ad-Din (Ninawa is indeed strategic province since it is neighboring with Syria and ISIS needs it to have comfortable connection with their operations in Syria). 170 ISIS also made its move to harass ISF in Mosul area, where Iraqi forces had strong presence unlike in more sparsely populated desert areas where ISIS already enjoyed freedom of movement. As Lewis notes: -ISF presence in the city is extensive, but Iraqi Army and Federal Police are also sociallyostracized and mismatched against the demographic ofthe population.‖ 171 Mosul is also largely divided city, with competing fractions of Kurds, Christians, salafist Ansar as-Sunna, Ba"athist groups etc. ISIS then can promote sectarian violence by targeting minorities and at the same time pose as a savior and promoter of Sunni interest. Attacks on Sunni population by hated ISF and Sahwa members ramped up and population welcomed them. 172 At the same time ISIS operatives were targeting anti-Baghdad but non-complying with ISIS tribal and political leaders in the area with cold-blooded calculation getting rid of any political opposition. Tens of notables were assassinated by ISIS. For example on August 27, ISIS killed leader of the Bagran tribes in Mosul, Barza Hazim al-Badrani, south of Mosul.
173 Such approach is indeed hallmark of brutal, yet effective, ISIS strategy in prelude to assuming full control of given area -co-optation of willing and coercion or killing any possible other center of political power.
ISIS subsequently pushed for example along Mosul-Baghdad highway to disrupt supply lines for ISF stationed in Ninawa (see Map No. 8. 2: ISIS Activites in Ninawa in 2013). Expansion in Salah ad-Din, al-Anbar, and to Diyala provinces occurred. 174 ISF were not successful in containing insurgents. An autumn/winter large-scale offensive in 2013 aiming at retaking parts of Diyala river valley from ISIS was partially successful and drove militants into hiding. 175 On the other hand, ISIS soon responded with counter-offensive in al-Anbar province in
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January 2014 during which symbolic city of Fallujah fall and ISIS assumed control other over strategic west of Baghdad territory. 176 Map No. 8. 2: ISIS Activites in Ninawa in 2013. 177 For the first half of 2014, ISIS violent campaign and spreading direct presence continued. Indeed, it was not a sudden move but in many ways moving in into for years prepared positions. Sleeper cells were activated, ISIS members blend in among the population and conducting covertly criminal enterprises or preparing terrorist attacks simply came out of shadows. 178 There were not so many "offensive units" per se conducting military-like offensives even in June 2014. It is estimated that ISIS had just some 10 thousand militants prior June 2014 in Iraq and Syria combined 179 and cities manned with thousands or Iraqi soldiers were falling into hands of only hundreds militants coming to towns (typical example is Mosul 180 where 30.000 ISF members simply fled amid attack of just some 800 militants freeing reportedly hundreds additional manpower from prisons during the attack 181 ). Not only ISF were demoralized 182 , but collapse was also result of chronically flawed planning, leadership and ill training. 183 Initially, ISIS also cooperated with other Sunni rebel groups often with ex-Ba"athist background, since their tactical interest driving out Baghdad forces overlapped (such as Izzat ad-Douri"s loose alliance called "General Council of Iraqi Revolutionaries", operating mainly north of Baghdad, or "1920 Brigades"). 184 These alliances were only short-term alliances, and ISIS eventually marginalized them by incorporation, coercion, and liquidation.
June 2014 is indeed a breaking point since ISIS conducted sweep through Sunni areas, advancing to Mosul, Bayji, Samarra, or even Tikrit, almost reaching outskirts of Baghdad. But fighting was intensive even in 2013 with 10.000 dead civilians, and 2.300 ISF membersindicator of a success of the "Soldier Harvest Campaign", since a year before ISF lost just 800 men (see graphs in chapter 3). Only for the first half of 2014, 10.300 civilians were killed, and reportedly several thousands of ISF members (there are no clear figures). ISIS in June reached the fourth stage of its insurgency, it reached "military equilibrium" -a point at which it was able to meet ISF in an open battlefield. The Caliphate was then declared at the end of June 2014 with Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as "Caliph Ibrahim" in charge. In late 2014, CIA also increased estimated manpower of ISIS from previsously stated 10.000 to 20.000-31.500. 185 Current estimates go even much higher up to 100.000 or more militants (included support personnel).
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ISIS has considerable success in controlling territory. However, their grip is tight and presence stable only in major cities such as Mosul. 187 In rural areas and in smaller towns, it relies on local Sunni tribal allies which plegded loyalty to them openly, or cooperate with them "unofficially". ISIS apparently learned its lesson from 2005-2006, when it angered Sunni tribes which turned back on them and many of the tribes joined Sahwa. Sunni tribes cooperate with ISIS, and tribes or tribal milities who defy ISIS rule are being targeted (such as killings of hundreds Albu Nimr tribesmen loyal to Baghdad in November 2014 188 ). Prominenent Sahwa commanders are targeted by ISIS, but it seems regular members have chance to "atone" and join ISIS (as it is shown for example Clanging of the Swords Part IV movie 189 ). Indeed, ISIS epxloited presence of exBa"athist figures within its ranks which have expertise in intelligence operations. Apparently ISIS had long lists nurtured over the years of covert presence that contained names of possible opposition, security forces members, people loyal to Baghdad, and along with ISIS" assuming the control of territory it immediately came for such "inconvenient people" and murdered them (it is ofen shown in their propaganda outlets to disow fear into possible opposing people and groups 190 ). The number of assassinated is hard to estimate, but it is an established pattern in each ISIS-taken area, so numbers are most probably in many thousands.
3 ISIS in 2015
A long proclaimed "spring offensive" in April/May aiming at retaking the main center of ISISMosul did not occur. 191 In the end of February 2015, the US officials admitted that the offensive would not take place. 192 ISF supported by Shi"ite militias and their Iranian backers conducted offensive to retake Tikrit, which as of May 2015 remains under control of Baghdad. Offensive operations, however, ceased there. Feared Shi"ite militias 193 (indeed strengthening Sunnis compliance with ISIS harsh rule) reportedly moved to Tikrit and commit atrocities on Sunni civilians. 194 ISIS counter-operation in May 2015 resulted in the fall of yet another major city of Ramadi in al-Anbar province.
195 ISF fled in panic amid ISIS offensive in direction to Baghdad, leaving arms and ammunition along with hundreds of military vehicles and armored carriers behind to fall in the hands of ISIS militants. 196 In Syria, ISIS conducted major offensive to take the strategic city of Palmyra in May 2015 197 , and in general engaged in offensive operation mostly against other opposition groups. Tactical success with breaking the siege of Kobanî did not damage ISIS military capabilities although it ties considerable number of their forces to contain Kurdish forces.
Anti-ISIS Coalition"s airstrike seem to achieve successes in targeting senior ISIS commanders. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi himself was seriously injured in March 2015 (he might be even incapacitated). 198 In May, a man who temporarily replaced him, Abu Alaa al-"Afri, was reportedly killed in an airstrike in Tal Afar west of Mosul along with other senior cadres. 199 US Delta Force commando conducted a ground operation in Syria close to Dair az-Zaur in May that killed Abu Sayyaf -a figure behing ISIS economical operations, nicknamed "emir of oil and gas". 200 Killing commanders indeed cannot eradicate ISIS problem, but it can seriously damage and disrupt the organisation. After all, even ISIS has only limited number of truly charismatic and skilful leaders, and subsequent internal struggle for leadership can also discard seemingly coherent organisation.
ISIS governance is, on the other hand, considerably faltering in controlled territories. Basic services like running water, electricity, garbage disposal, healthcare are scarce in the cities like ar-Raqqa, or Mosul. 201 Economic system in controlled territories is also in decline -prices of basic goods and food are rising. 202 This development itself, however, cannot beat ISIS. It can only damage it and stretch its manpower and resources, since it must resort into increased coercion to ensure compliance of the population. ISIS also seems to uphold their tribal alliances which ensure it does not need to have direct strong presence in rural areas. Most Sunni tribes both in Syria and Iraq still opt for ISIS facing either coercion, but in most cases due to incentives in form of for example a share in criminal enterprises, and by leaving them alone in exchange for their loyalty. 204 "Management of Savagery", sometimes translated as "Administration of Barbarism"), draws up a "grand strategy" of how to defeat superpowers, meaning mainly the US, and also ilustrates path to establishment of Islamic State. 205 Naji gathers his inspiration in previous breaking jihadi works: Milestones on the Road by Sayyid Qutb 206 , or az-Zawahiri"s well-known book The Knights under the Prophet's Banner, 207 or monstrous 1600-page book of the senior al-Qaeda ideologue known as Abu Musa"ab as-Suri. 208 Naji urges jihadists to carefully study Western works on administration to gain the ability to govern controlled territories; sociology to understand how to engage with tribal structures, or military strategy to better conduct military operations. ISIS adheres to these principles not only in waging a skillful propaganda by using Western technology, but also urges "Western-educated" Muslim experts to come to Caliphate to help. 209 ISIS also openly for Muslim experts from abroad to come and help with "state-building" in the text named -A Call to all Muslims, scholars, doctors, engineers, and specialists‖ which was published in an English-written magazine Dabiq.
210 "Learning from the enemy" is, however, something that has resonated in the works of jihadist movement for years; it is not a thing newly employed by ISIS.
Naji also introduces his strategic path to establishment of Caliphate in three steps. The first step is called "vexation and exhaustion" and aims at attacking sensitive targets (such as oil and other infrastructure) in order to make counterinsurgent to guard these critical places. Subsequently, counterinsurgent will pullout his forces from peripheral areas and many towns which creates security vacuum. In existing chaos, jihadists move in and provide population with administration and basic services, gaining the sympathy of the population. It is indeed what happened in Syria in 2013, when in many areas ISIS was welcomed as a "stabilizer" which expelled other rebels. 211 In the case of Iraq, ISIS was also greeted by many as a protector of Sunni interest against Shi"ites.
In the second phase called "administration of savagery" 212 , there are areas administered by jihadists, sort of network of jihadist "mini-states". These are later carefully connected to each other and work as a network which eventually leads to the final stage -establishment of Caliphate (Naji, however, does not discuss in detail transformation from the second to the final third stage). ISIS had moved to through the second and third stage already and effectively controls vast areas where it attempts to govern (albeit it proves to be hardly sustainable governance in the long term 213 ).
Naji asserts that there is not "softness" since -Regardless of whether we use harshness or softness, our enemies will not be merciful to us if they seize us. Thus, it behooves us to make them think one thousand times before attacking us.‖ 214 ISIS adheres to its idea and invests considerable resources into sowing fear not only among existing enemies (e. g. well-propagated beheadings and mass executions of members of opposing security forces), potential enemies (mass killing of Sunni Albu Nimr tribesmen in Iraq in November 2014 who worked for Baghdad government in past 215 ), but also within its own population (public executions of "defiant" civilians, alleged "spies" etc. ISIS widely promotes sectarian violence between Sunnis and Shi"ites (also by staging attacks against Shia civilian targets to provoke hatred for Sunnis, which has been hallmark of their strategy since 2004), and then presents itself as the only group that can save Sunnis facing Shi"ites revenge. 217 Naji describes the process as a "policy of polarization", when -Dragging the masses into the battle requires more actions which will inflame opposition and which will make the people enter into the battle, willing or unwilling, such that each individual will go to the side | 21 which he supports. We must make this battle very violent, such that death is a heartbeat away, so that the two groups will realize that entering this battle will frequently lead to death.‖ 218 Another interesting point of Abu Bakr Naji that ISIS skillfully employs is engagement with the Sunni tribes (perhaps more due to ISIS" own painful experience when Sunni tribes turned against them in 2007-2008 in Iraq during Sahwa campaign). ISIS offers them their share of wealth and power (e. g. in criminal networks), collects their bay"ats, and in most areas "leave them alone" if they are loyal to ISIS. 219 Naji also asserts that jihadists must learn to better engage with tribal and ethnic groups to exploit them properly. As Brachman and McCants note, -Naji advocates buying off tribal leaders and justifies his position by adducing examples of the Prophet doing the same.‖ 220 Hassan Hassan claims that "Management of Savagery" was and still is circulated among ISIS cadres as one of the main books used to justify and ilustrate its strategy. 221 After all, given Naji"s prominence, it is highly probable that many of the higher cadres from behing Syrian and iraqi borders know his work. There are reports that it is often read by al-Qaeda in Yemen 222 , or ash-Shabaab in Somalia 223 . Michael Ryan 224 points out that in the first issue of an English-written ISIS magazine "The Return of Khilafah", ISIS simply copies Naji"s above mentioned three stages and adheres them to az-Zarqawi"s thinking. 225 ISIS indeed passed to the stage when it fueled chaos, exploited it and moved in as a savior of population (both in Syria and Iraq), and started to "manage the savagery" by providing governance. The third stageestablishment of Islamic State has also already happened in June 2014. Note that Naji considers jihadist-established "administrations of barbarism" rather as a network that has to carefully maintain connections between its parts in order to establish viable Caliphate. It is indeed the case of ISIS which fully controls few key major centers (ar-Raqqah, Mosul, Dair az-Zaur...) and in other areas it only has limited presence, and relies on tribal allies. 226 On the other hand, Naji worries about targeting other Muslims and subsequently losing "perception battle" for the global jihadist cause while attacking civilians, which indeed puts a break on the above mentioned "policy of polarization". 227 He identifies it as the main weakness of the contemporary jihadist movement. That is something that ISIS does not respect much and rather carries on az-Zarqawi"s legacy of attacking civilians targets, fueling sectarian violence, and spreading "savagery". Many contemporary articles ignore this "break" and rather focus only on some parts of Naji"s works. 228 As Brachman and McCants note that Naji still strongly reflects thinking of al-Qaeda"s High Command throughout 1990s. 229 Abu Bakr Naji draws a strategy how to establish "Caliphate on the ground" in the first part of his book but in the rest of the text he is still in the al-Qaeda"s global jihad mindset, which much more carefully wages "perception battles". And al-Qaeda"s az-Zawahiri numerously warned ISIS and its predecessors that it should not se deliberately target civilians. This paper argues that it is useful to approach ISIS campaign within the broad concept of insurgency. Rich literature on insurgency and counterinsurgency that bloomed after the Western experience in Iraq and Afghanistan offers a solid framework for analysis. RAND Corporation 
